

## Message Text

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ACTION SS-30

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FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 5896

EXDIS/SALT

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E. O. 11652: ZGDSI

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: SEMENOV STATEMENT, NOVEMBER 6, 1973 (SALT TWO-341)

FOLLOWING ARE TRANSLATIONS (1) SEMENOV STATEMENT  
AND (2) REPLY BY TRUSOV TO U. S. QUESTION ON SLBM LEVELS,  
TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 6, 1973.

SEmenov STATEMENT, NOVEMBER 6, 1973  
THE STATEMENT YOU MADE AT TODAY'S MEETING WILL  
BE STUDIED BY THE SOVIET SIDE WITH DUE CARE AND THOROUGHNESS.

IN CONNECTION WITH YOUR STATEMENT OF NOVEMBER 2,  
1973, WE WOULD LIKE TO NOTE THAT, AS SHOWN BY THE RESULTS  
OF THE SUMMIT MEETINGS IN MAY 1972 AND JUNE 1973, THE SOVIET  
UNION AND THE UNITED STATES REACHED A DECISION CONCERNING  
MUTUAL MEASURES TO LIMIT STRATEGIC ARMS. CONCLUSION OF  
THE ABM TREATY AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT IN MAY 1972 HAS  
CONVINCINGLY DEMONSTRATED THE POSSIBILITY OF AND NEED FOR  
AGREED SOLUTIONS FOR THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS.

THE CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS POLICY TO SEARCH FOR  
MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE MEASURES TO LIMIT STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE  
ARMS WAS AFFIRMED BY THE DOCUMENT ENTITLED BASIC PRINCIPLES  
OF NEGOTIATIONS, SIGNED AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL ON JUNE 21, 1973.  
CLEARLY OUR TASK IS, GUIDED BY THIS DOCUMENT, TO SEARCH FOR  
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CONCRETE SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF LIMITING STRATEGIC

OFFENSIVE ARMS ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE. WE NOTE THAT IN ITS STATEMENT AT THE NOVEMBER 2, 1973 MEETING, THE U. S. SIDE CONFIRMED THAT PRECISELY THIS PRINCIPLE MUST LIE AT THE BASIS OF THE PERMANENT AGREEMENT.

CONSISTENT IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS PRINCIPLE REQUIRES THAT IN SOLVING THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN WORKING OUT A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE PERMANENT AGREEMENT THE STRATEGIC SITUATION BE CONSIDERED IN ALL ITS SCOPE. AS YOU KNOW, IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS, THE STRATEGIC SITUATION IS DETERMINED BY THE TOTALITY OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, AS WELL AS BY A NUMBER OF FACTORS, INCLUDING THE SPECIFICS OF THE GEOGRAPHIC SITUATION OF THE SIDES AND THE PRESENCE AND BUILD-UP OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THIRD COUNTRIES.

PRECISELY SUCH AN APPROACH REPRESENTS A REASONABLE AND PRACTICAL BASIS FOR SEEKING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE PROVISIONS FOR THE PERMANENT AGREEMENT, A BASIS WHICH TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE OBJECTIVE SITUATION. THE DRAFT PERMANENT AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, TABLED BY THE SOVIET SIDE ON OCTOBER 9, 1973, ACCORDINGLY IS BASED PRECISELY ON AN ANALYSIS OF THE STRATEGIC SITUATION IN ALL ITS SCOPE.

THE SOVIET DRAFT AGREEMENT COVERS THE WHOLE COMPLEX OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, I. E., ALL THOSE OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS WHICH, DUE TO THEIR CHARACTERISTICS OR THANKS TO THEIR GEOGRAPHIC DEPLOYMENT, ARE CAPABLE OF STRIKING TARGETS. ON THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER SIDE. IT PROVIDES FOR ADEQUATE MEASURES TO LIMIT THESE ARMS, WHICH HAVE BEEN WORKED OUT WITH AN ACCOUNT FOR ALL THE FACTORS INFLUENCING THE STRATEGIC SITUATION. IN ADDITION TO LIMITATIONS ON LAND-BASED ICBMS, SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES, AND STRATEGIC BOMBERS AND THEIR ARMAMENT, THE DRAFT PROVIDES FOR RESOLUTION OF THE QUESTION OF PHASED WITHDRAWAL OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS AND LIQUIDATION OF CORRESPONDING BASES, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLES VI AND VII.

MEASURES ARE ALSO PROVIDED ON MUTUAL LIMITATION OF QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENT OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WHICH THE USSR DELEGATION ADDRESSED IN ITS STATEMENTS OF OCTOBER 19 AND NOVEMBER 2, 1973.

A CAREFUL AND UNBIASED ANALYSIS SHOWS THAT THE DRAFT PERMANENT AGREEMENT OF OCTOBER 9, 1973 CONTAINS THAT

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NECESSARY TOTAL OF PROVISIONS, WHICH FULLY TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE STRATEGIC SITUATION IN ALL ITS SCOPE AND IN ITS LONG-TERM ASPECTS AND THEREFORE IS FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE.

CONVERSELY, AN APPROACH WHICH SINGLED OUT AND LIMITED ONLY SOME INDIVIDUAL TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS--"CENTRAL" AS THEY HAVE BEEN CALLED HERE--AND IGNORED OTHER NO LESS IMPORTANT WEAPONS OF ONE SIDE, WHICH

ARE CAPABLE OF NUCLEAR STRIKES ON TARGETS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER SIDE, AS WELL AS A NUMBER OF FACTORS INFLUENCING THE STRATEGIC SITUATION, WOULD IN ESSENCE BE A DEPARTURE FROM THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY. UNDER THAT SORT OF AN APPROACH ONE OF THE SIDES COULD OBTAIN UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES, AND THIS WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE MENTIONED ABOVE.

THE SOVIET SIDE HAS ALREADY EXPRESSED ITS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE CONCEPT OF DIVIDING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS INTO SO-CALLED "CENTRAL" AND "NON-CENTRAL" SYSTEMS. IT IS QUITE OBVIOUS THAT SUCH A CONCEPT IS AIMED AT CONFIRMING SUBSTANTIVE INEQUALITY, IN AS MUCH AS THOSE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WHICH THE OTHER SIDE DOES NOT INCLUDE AMONG "CENTRAL" SYSTEMS REMAIN OUTSIDE CONSIDERATION, ACCOUNT IS NOT TAKEN OF THE SPECIFICS OF THE SITUATION OF THE SIDES FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THE GEOGRAPHIC AND OTHER FACTORS INFLUENCING THE STRATEGIC SITUATION, AND IN ADDITION SINCE IT IS NOT TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT THAT ONE OF THE SIDES HAS NUCLEAR WEAPONS BASES IN THIRD COUNTRIES.

IN THIS LIGHT, PROPOSALS ON SO-CALLED "ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE" IN LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS, SLBM LAUNCHERS AND STRATEGIC BOMBERS CANNOT BE ACKNOWLEDGED AS BEING CONSISTENT WITH THE TASK OF WORKING OUT A DRAFT PERMANENT AGREEMENT, SINCE SUCH PROPOSALS ARE NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE.

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ACTION SS-30

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 5896

EXDIS/SALT

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

IN ITS STATEMENTS OF NOVEMBER 2, 1973 AND OF TODAY  
THE U.S. DELEGATION ONCE AGAIN RAISED THE QUESTION OF ICBM  
"THROWWEIGHT." AS I HAVE ALREADY SAID, WE HAVE CAREFULLY  
LISTENED TO YOUR STATEMENT AT TODAY'S MEETING AND WE WILL  
STUDY IT.

I WOULD LIKE TO NOTE, HOWEVER, THAT IN THE COURSE OF  
PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS THE USSR DELEGATION HAS REPEATEDLY  
EXPRESSED ITS ATTITUDE TOWARD THIS QUESTION.

IT HAS ALREADY BEEN SAID ABOVE THAT NEGOTIATION OF A  
MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF LIMITING  
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS CAN BE BASED ONLY ON CONSIDERA-  
TION OF THE STRATEGIC SITUATION IN ALL ITS SCOPE. IN THIS  
CONTEXT IT IS NECESSARY ALSO TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE ACTUAL  
DIRECTIONS TAKEN BY EACH SIDE IN DEVELOPING ITS STRATEGIC  
OFFENSIVE ARMS. AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, THIS IS RECOGNIZED  
BY THE U.S. SIDE AS WELL. THEREFORE, IN CONSIDERING  
QUESTIONS OF LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IT WOULD BE  
WRONG TO SINGLE OUT, AS A CONDITION FOR REACHING AGREEMENT,  
ONE ARBITRARILY SELECTED CHARACTERISTIC OF ONE OF THE TYPES  
OF THESE WEAPONS. AS YOU KNOW, THE OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS  
OF ANY TYPE OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPON, INCLUDING ICBMS,

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DEPENDS NOT ONLY ON SOME "THROWWEIGHT" CAPABILITY OR  
OTHER, BUT ALSO ON A NUMBER NO LESS IMPORTANT  
PARAMETERS.

SINGLING OUT ONE ARBITRARILY SELECTED CHARACTERISTIC  
OF ONE TYPE OF STRATEGIC WEAPON FROM THIS TOTALITY OF FACTORS  
IS IN ESSENCE BASED ON A ONE-SIDED APPROACH AND IS NOT IN  
LINE WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY  
OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE. SPECIFICALLY, SUCH AN APPROACH DOES  
NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE "THROWWEIGHT" CAPABILITIES OF  
STRATEGIC BOMBERS AND OF SUCH STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS  
AS FORWARD-BASED NUCLEAR SYSTEMS AND DELIVERY AIRCRAFT ON  
ATTACK AIRCRAFT CARRIERS. THIS CLEARLY FAILS TO TAKE INTO  
ACCOUNT OTHER FACTORS, TOO, WHICH INFLUENCE THE STRATEGIC  
SITUATION.

ACTUALLY, "THROWWEIGHT" IS ONE OF THE CHARACTERISTICS  
OF ANY TYPE OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPON. AND IT IS NOT AT  
ALL SIMPLE TO TELL FOR WHICH OF THEM IT IS MOST IMPORTANT.  
TO TAKE STRATEGIC BOMBERS FOR EXAMPLE, EACH ONE OF THEM HAS A  
SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER "THROWWEIGHT" THAN THE LARGEST EXISTING  
BALLISTIC MISSILE.

THEREFORE, IF THE U.S. SIDE IS GOING TO TALK ABOUT TAKING INTO ACCOUNT "THROWWEIGHT," THEN, ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE, IT SHOULD TALK ABOUT LIMITATIONS ON THE TOTAL THROWWEIGHT OF THE TOTALITY OF THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS UNDER CONSIDERATION. AT LEAST THIS WOULD EXCLUDE THE BIASED SELECTION OF THAT TYPE OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPON WHOSE "THROWWEIGHT" IT IS PROPOSED TO LIMIT.

MR. AMBASSADOR,

ARTICLE III OF THE SOVIET DRAFT PERMANENT AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS CONTAINS PROVISIONS ON THE LIMITATION OF FIXED LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS.

AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, IN THE COURSE OF PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS IT BECAME APPARENT THAT THE SIDES HAVE A COMMON VIEW

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REGARDING THE IMPORTANCE OF LIMITING THIS TYPE OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPON IN ORDER TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AS A WHOLE. IN WORKING OUT THE LIMITATIONS CONTAINED IN THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, THE SIDES CARRIED OUT EXTENSIVE AND COMPLEX WORK WHICH INCLUDED A THOROUGH ANALYSIS OF AND AN ACCOUNT FOR A NUMBER OF FACTORS OF A MILITARY-STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL NATURE, BOTH CURRENT AND LONG-TERM, AS WELL AS COMPLEX DETAILS OF A TECHNICAL NATURE CONCERNING THE TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS BEING LIMITED.

THE SOVIET SIDE BELIEVES THAT THE PERMANENT AGREEMENT SHOULD CONTAIN A PROVISION TO THE EFFECT THAT THERE MUST BE NO BUILD-UP IN THE NUMBER OF FIXED LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS.

TRUSOV STATEMENT, NOVEMBER 6, 1973

IN REGARD TO ARTICLE IV OF THE SOVIET DRAFT AGREEMENT THE U.S. SIDE HAS RAISED THE QUESTION OF WHAT MAXIMUM NUMBER OF SLBM LAUNCHERS WOULD BE PERMITTED EACH SIDE AND HOW THESE MAXIMUM LEVELS WOULD BE REACHED.

I WOULD LIKE TO REMIND YOU THAT ACCORDING TO ARTICLE IV OF THE SOVIET DRAFT THE SIDES WOULD UNDERTAKE TO LIMIT SLBM LAUNCHERS AND MODERN SLBM SUBMARINES TO THE NUMBERS SPECIFIED IN THE PROTOCOL TO THE INTERIM AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE USA ON CERTAIN MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS OF MAY 26, 1972.

THIS PROTOCOL AND THE SUPPLEMZKRY DOCUMENTS RELATED  
THERETO SPECIFY THE MAXIMUM LEVELS FOR SLBM LAUNCHERS AND  
MODERN SLBM SUBMARINES, AS WELL AS THE PROCEDURE FOR  
REACHING THESE LEVELS, SPECIFICALLY THROUGH CORRESPONDING  
REPLACEMENT OF ICBM LAUNCHERS OF OLDER TYPES.

IT IS ALSO SPECIFIED IN THE PROTOCOL THAT DEPLOYMENT  
OF MODERN SLBMS ON ANY SUBMARINE, REGARDLESS OF ITS TYPE,  
WILL BE COUNTED TOWARD THE OVERALL LEVEL OF SLBMS PERMITTED  
FOR THE USSR AND THE U.S.

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THUS THE CONTENT OF ARTICLE IV WHICH PROVIDES FOR  
RETAINING THE LIMITATIONS SPECIFIED IN THE PROTOCOL TO THE  
INTERIM AGREEMENT SPECIFIES WITH COMPLETE PREVISION THE  
MAXIMUM LEVELS OF SLBM LAUNCHERS AND MODERN SLBM  
SUBMARINES, AS WELL AS THE WAYS OF ACHIEVING THESE LEVELS.

IN CONCLUSION I WOULD LIKE TO NOTE THAT THE PROTOCOL  
TO THE INTERIM AGREEMENT WAS THE RESULT OF A THOROUGH AND  
COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF THE QUESTION OF LIMITING SLBM  
LAUNCHERS AND MODERN SLBM SUBMARINES, AND WE BELIEVE  
THAT RETENTION OF ITS PROVISIONS IN THE PERMANENT AGREEMENT  
WOULD BE FULLY IN ACCORD WITH THE OBJECTIVES OF THE AGREEMENT  
AND THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF  
UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE, WHICH MUST FORM ITS BASIS.

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